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I. Introduction
In the postwar history of Western Europe, the period from 1958 to
1972 stands out as the time of the economic division of this part
of the world into two trading blocs: the European Economic Com-
munity (EEC), established in 1958, and the European Free Trade
Association (EFTA), formed two years later. Before 1958, institu-
tions dealing with the entire region had helped to shape trade
policy in Europe; after 1972, the two trading blocs fused into
one as all EFTA countries either joined the EEC or concluded
free-trade agreements with the Community. This paper investigates
some of the causes and consequences of the EEC-EFTA rift in the
1960s, focusing on the role played by Germany, i.e., the country
which, of all EEC members, had the closest trade links to coun-
tries across the divide. Therefore, we will
sketch out some arguments of the theory of regional liberali-
sation (Chapter II),
discuss the major determinants of the actual German trade pol-
icy in the 1950s and 1960s (Chapter III),
assess the impact of the economic division of Western Europe
on Germany's foreign trade (Chapter IV).
The concluding remarks (Chapter V) will take up the question
whether Germany's integration into a "little Europe" and the par-
allel economic division of Western Europe were a necessary stage
on the way towards freer trade in this part of the world or a
costly detour.
j • • .••'..•
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II. Observations on the Logic of Regional Liberalisation
II.a. The Political Economy of Regionalism
Any inquiry into the determinants of trade policy has to be based
on an analysis of the paradox of protection, namely the fact that
trade in the real world is severely distorted by state interven-
tions although most economists have claimed for a long time that
the abolition of almost any trade barrier would (i) be in the
interest of the greater majority of individuals and (ii) result- 2 -
in aggregate gains far greater than aggregate losses . Some ex-
planations for this divergence between theory and practice focus
on those rather special cases in which the benefits of protection
might outweigh the costs, at least in the short run and in the
absence of retaliation (optimum tariff argument, strategic pro-
tection, externalities that can - for whatever reason - not be
internalised by subsidies).
Apart from these answers, economists have two standard explana-
tions for the paradox of protection. Both focus on deficiencies
in the political process which transforms individual preferences
into collective policies:
Firstly, rent-seeking interest groups can influence the outcome
of this political process through payments or equivalent favours
to established bureaucrats and politicians or to candidates seek-
ing office. True, in a state of what we may call "perfect corrup-
tion" , free trade would still emerge: as the gains from liberal-
isation exceed the losses, a coalition of free traders could al-
ways outbid a coalition of protectionists in the "political mar-
ket" . Unfortunately, due to the free-rider problem inherent in
collective action (Olson 1965), a lobby representing the small
number of individuals who expect to gain from a particular trade
barrier is much more likely to emerge, to remain stable, and to
extract the required resources from its members than any collec-
tive body of prospective losers, i.e., the large number of con-
sumers and domestic producers who would be hurt by the intricate
domestic and international repercussions of the protectionist
measure.
Secondly, voters fail to elect a sufficient number of free mar-
keteers. The gains from a trade barrier tend to be concentrated
To put it somewhat technically: in the absence of transaction
costs, beneficiaries could collectively compensate losers in such
a way that, by their own standards, all individuals would end up
better off than before liberalisation.- 3 -
on a minority of individuals who will thus take notice and vote
accordingly, while the. losses are so dispersed and unnoticeable
that the majority of those who lose will remain in a state of
"rational ignorance" (Downs 1957).
In a typical West European democracy with a high turn-out of vo-
ters in national elections, the second argument has one important
implication: protectionist lobbies and politicians can be suc-
cessful only to the extent that the negative effects of a certain
trade barrier do not surpass the threshold level at which it be-
comes rational for a majority of voters to take these effects
into account, i.e., to devote time and effort to getting informa-
tion on the costs of protectionism and to vote accordingly. This
points towards the main requirement for a feasible liberalisation
strategy: if the gains from liberalisation are perceived as being
sufficiently large, the voters are c.p. likely to back free-trade
oriented candidates, or, more to the point, re-elect politicians
who have improved the lot of the electorate by a turn towards
sound policies to such an extent that the majority of voters
takes notice before the next election. Consequently, a rational
politician who would lose votes if he abolished one particular
trade barrier has an incentive to create a link between a large
number of liberalisation measures. The broader the implemented
package is, the more diluted and uncertain will be the losses and
the more visible will be the benefits - as long as the package
does not include, too many genuinely unpopular measures which the
majority of voters would oppose even in the absence of informa-
tion costs.
Of course, issue linkage is no guarantee for a free-trade major-
ity: as the log-rolling literature teaches, distributional coali-
tions may devise a bundle of measures which shifts all the costs
2)
Throughout this essay we assume the existence of generally
accepted meta rules which imply that policies and rules for
policy-making can be changed by majority decisions, i.e., without
the need for unanimity.— 4 —
of protectionism onto a minority (c.f. Frey 1985; Baldwin 1976).
Although coalitions of this kind tend to be unstable, they may
well command a majority of votes at any point in time. However,
do not forget that the incentive to support such a coalition de-
pends critically on what the individual voter knows about how he
will be affected now and in the future: The closer a liberalisa-
tion package comes to a general and durable rule that trade shall
be free, the less certain can any potential opponent be (i) that
he, in his present position, will be a net loser, and (ii) that
at some time in the future he might not assume a different posi-
3) tion and turn into a beneficiary . The greater the uncertainty
about the present and future distributional consequences of lib-
eralisation, the more relevance will be attached to the gains in
allocative efficiency: rational individuals will increasingly
identify the change in their personal fortunes with the expected
average per capita gains from freer trade. If the "veil of uncer-
tainty" (Brennan and Buchanan 1985) is thick enough, general
rules instead of specific outcomes will be the subject of polit-
ical discussion and choice; as the benefits from liberalisation
exceed the costs, protectionists are most unlikely to carry the
day. Thus, even a courageous unilateral liberalisation, say in
the form of a free-trade amendment to the constitution, may not
be infeasible in a world of uncertainty.
The following paragraphs will assess some of the conditions which
determine the relative feasibility of three kinds of packages:
(i) a thorough unilateral liberalisation, (ii) global (broad mul-
tilateral) liberalisation, and (iii) regional (mini lateral/bilat-
eral ) liberalisation.
Apart from its economic merits, unilateral liberalisation has one
important advantage: it does not depend on the present
3)
Note that the very instability of distributional coalitions
works in the same direction: it increases the uncertainty about
the actual distributional effects of any deviation from the
free-trade optimum.- 5 -
collaboration and future reliability of foreign politicians. How-
ever, pursuing the unilateral approach means putting sweeping
demands on the willingness of voters to acquire and process in-
formation about the overall effects of liberalisation. This may
be a realistic option in times of a general awareness that dras-
tic change is needed, i.e., in times of a deep crisis, or - oddly
enough - in times in which the remarkable success of a recent
liberalisation has drawn public attention to the issue. Under
ordinary circumstances, that is in a situation in which voters
have grown accustomed to the prevailing level of barriers to
trade, the mere proposal of a general rule that international
transactions shall be free from state interventions is unlikely
to mobilise sufficient support to overcome protectionist resis-
tance.
Unfortunately, unilateralism has further drawbacks. Besides the
fact that the unilateral package by its very nature cannot be as
encompassing as a plurilateral one, the main additional obstacles
worth mentioning a.rei
- a deterioration in the terms of trade if the country is not
faced with infinite elasticities of import supply and export
demand on the world market,
a reduced bargaining power in future international trade nego-
tiat ions,
the ease with which such a package can be repealed (unless it
is enshrined in the constitution), and - most importantly -
- the insufficient incentive for exporters to lobby in favour of
it.
Again, issue linkage may offer a way out. The task is to devise a
liberalisation package which, in addition to the widespread
gains, confers clearly visible benefits to a well-defined group
of individuals. The most plausible way for a politician to
achieve this is to link the reduction of national trade barriers
to that of other countries so that domestic exporters will expect
direct gains (Hauser 1986) and act as a countervailing lobby
against protectionist interest groups. Although a unilateral im-
port liberalisation would promote exports as well, the benefits- 6 -
would be more dispersed and less certain than in the case of a
multilateral package. This problem is aggravated if exchange
rates are fixed. Instead of benefitting directly from a devalua-
tion induced by higher imports, exporters will not feel the posi-
tive effects until their input prices finally start to fall under
the pressure of increased competition (or a reduced money sup-
ply). .
As the gains from mutual liberalisation depend on the scope of
the package, a global or at least a broad multilateral approach
would be best, However, the problems of finding 1 ike-minded part-
ners, striking a deal and devising ways to make it stick increase
with the number of countries concerned. The essence of a package
deal is to alter expected pay-offs from specific policy options
by creating a link between issues. Hence, the whole package deal
could unravel if one participant were to defect, causing sunk
costs for those agents who had already adapted to the expected
new trade regime.
Unless he can bank on a genuine multilateral consensus that free
trade is and will remain best, or unless a hegemon or a powerful
supra-national authority exists to enforce an international
agreement, a more feasible approach for a liberalisation-minded
politician might be to strive for a deal with a limited number of
his country's major trading partners, at least as a first step
towards a more far-reaching liberalisation. If the deal is struck
between countries with a high degree of interdependence in a var-
iety of fields, the problems of negotiating an agreement and the
potential incentives to abrogate the deal in later years are re-
duced (Axelrod and Keohane 1986).
Opposition from protectionist lobbies will be comparatively weak
if the preferential trade area is formed between industrial coun-
tries on a roughly similar level of development and with a rough-
ly similar factor endowment. In this case, the intensification of
the division of labour will be of the intra-industry rather than
the inter-industry type (Balassa 1966, Giersch 1986). This im-
plies the following: . . .- 7 -
relative factor prices will not change significantly to the
detriment of labour, i.e., the Stolper-Samuelson argument does
not apply (Krugman 1981);
structural adjustment can to a large extent take place within
firms so that factor mobility requirements are low and few
investments in human or physical capital will be rendered ob-
solete (few sunk costs);
there will be a sizeable number of beneficiaries even in those
few sectors of the economy which, as a whole, might be ad-
versely affected.
Therefore, neither labour as a whole nor lobbies of workers or
capital owners organised along sectoral lines will be strongly
incented to oppose the package. Furthermore, in a preferential
trade area between a limited number of similar countries, produc-
ers might frequently be able to form cross-border cartels and
thus mitigate the effects of increased competition (Machlup 1976)
- although this is clearly a disadvantage from a welfare point of
view. . •
The arguments sketched out above lead to the following conclu-
sions: The incentive for politicians to pursue a regional rather
than a broad multilateral approach to liberalisation is a posi-
tive function of
- the importance attached to the Stolper-Samuelson argument,
the importance of sunk costs in the expected adjustment pro-
cess , . .
- the degree of regional and sectoral factor immobility,
- the expected gains from intra-industry specialisation relative
to the overall gains from freer trade,
- the divergence. :of--interests and of perceptions of economic
reality between politicians of different countries, and
the length of the time lag until import liberalisation is seen
to enhance the competitive position of exporters.
Politicians can make their mutual commitment to uphold the free
trade, agreement more binding for themselves and their successors
by altering the expected pay-offs of defection, for instance (i)- 8 -
by creating institutions which cannot be ignored or resolved
without stirring up public interest in the matter, (ii) by at-
taching a genuinely popular label to the liberalisation package
(say "the uniting of Europe"), or (iii) by linking it to other
fields where the states involved share common interests (say the
strengthening of the "free West" in general and of a military
alliance in particular).
II.b. The Economics of Preferential Trade Areas
Apart from the special cases listed above (p. 2), the welfare
gains of a removal of trade barriers clearly exceed the costs. A
liberalisation induces a more efficient allocation of resources
(including the exploitation of economies of scale), diminishes
the scope for X-inefficiencies and increases the competitive
pressure on all producers so that the rate of productivity growth
might even be permanently higher than before. Even in a simple
and static partial analysis, the replacement of a domestic pro-
ducer by a cheaper foreign supplier is beneficial because the
additional consumer surplus is greater than the losses in tariff
revenue and producers' surplus.
However, the establishment of a customs union (or any other kind
of preferential trade area) has two main effects: it removes the
discrimination between suppliers from within the area; at the
same time, it introduces a discrimination between suppliers from
partner countries and from outside which did not exist before.
Therefore, additional imports from partner countries may replace
either less efficient domestic production ("trade creation") or,
if the tariff wedge exceeds the cost differential, imports from
more efficient extra-area producers ("trade diversion"). In the
latter case, the increase in the surplus of domestic consumers
may be smaller than the loss of producers' surplus and the fore-
gone tariff revenue.
As theorists of second-best solutions in general and customs un-
ions in particular have demonstrated, the net effect on the- 9 -
welfare of members of the union may thus be negative (for surveys
see Pelkmans 198*t, Grubel 1977, Ch. 27). However, even if the
balance of static effects is not entirely clear, one has to add
the dynamic gains from.trade creation. Therefore, the aggregate
gains are likely to exceed the conceivable losses from trade di-
version.
This does not apply to the countries outside the area. The par-
tial replacement of their exports by intra-area trade induces all
the static and dynamic welfare losses which arise from any volun-
tary or, as in their case, involuntary move away from the free-
trade optimum . The discrimination against their exports will
show up in both prices, i.e., as a deterioration of their terms,
of trade vis-a-vis the customs union, and quantities, i.e., as
trade diversion, with the relative importance of the second ef-
fect, being a positive function of the elasticity of their export
supply and the elasticity of substitution between intra-area and
extra-area producers in the customs union. As elasticities in-,
crease over the course of time, the relative importance of the
quantity effect will rise. In the same vein, trade diversion will
be especially pronounced if intra- rather than inter-industry
trade is affected most because of the high elasticity of substi-
tution between different variants of roughly the same product.
Furthermore, owners of internationally mobile capital, reluctant
to bear part of the losses from trade diversion and eager to par-
ticipate in the gains from trade creation, will invest.less in
these countries and more in the free-trade area. Incidentally, if
^)
This analysis presupposes that the common external tariff is
not reduced so as to compensate outsiders for the replacement of
their exports by intra-area trade. Kemp has demonstrated that a
customs union could always adjust its common external tariff in a
way which would leave no outsider worse off than before (Kemp
1976, p. 179 ff.). Furthermore, to the extent that the formation
of the union stimulates economic growth, member countries may
increase their demand for imports. If this effect is very
pronounced it may overcompensate.the reduction of trade with
non-member countries that is caused by ttrade diversion.- 10 -
this effect is very pronounced, countries outside the free-trade
area may experience such a sharp devaluation of their currencies
that they may even end up exporting more than before. In this
case, the losses from discrimination will show up in a substan-
tial deterioration of their terms of trade, in higher real inter-
est rates and an investment slump.
Because of the harmful effects of discrimination, countries out-
side the area now face a different set of alternatives than be-
fore: they can no longer opt for the status quo ante. At the same
time producers, consumers and politicians in extra-area countries
may watch the example of successful trade creation, more invest-
ment and hence faster growth within the ar&a.
Therefore, they now have a strong incentive to strive for multi-
lateral tariff reductions or for their country's entry into the
regional club , even if they had originally opposed the particular
liberalisation package on offer. Thus, a limited regional liber-
alisation may initiate a much broader move towards freer trade, a
result which would not have been attainable in global negotia-
tions. Because of these "dynamics of trade diversion", even econ-
omists who are aware that a regional arrangement is but a second-
best solution may welcome it as one step in the desired direction
(c.f. Giersch 1957).
III. The Economic Division of Western Europe
III.a. The Emergence of "Little Europe"
From 1948 onwards the American-inspired Organisation for European
Economic Co-operation (OEEC) skillfully used its share of the
Marshall Plan aid to promote the abolition of quantitative re-
strictions on intra-European and - with a delay - on
For a further discussion of open regional liberalisation clubs
see Giersch (1985) and Klepper (1986).- 11 -
cross-Atlantic trade (Schmieding 1987). Early attempts to estab-
lish a Western European customs union as well had but two meagre
results: (i) the customs union between Belgium-Luxemburg and the
Netherlands, and <ii) the standardised Brussels tariff nomencla-
tura of 1950. As quotas and not tariffs were the main impediments
to trade in the early fifties, the OEEC's choice of priorities
was quite understandable.
The issue of mutual tariff cuts was taken up at two very distinct
levels:
<1) The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) convened
three rather ineffective rounds of multilateral negotia-
tions: Annecy 19*t9, Torquay 1950-51 and Geneva (2) 1955-56,
with mutual tariff cuts of 2 '/., 3 */. and 2 */. respectively
(duller 1983).
(2) The idea of a customs union became an ingredient of politi-
cally motivated attempts to create close links between
France, Germany and those neighbours willing (or invited) to
join them.
On May 9, 1950, the French foreign minister, Robert Schuman, pro-
posed a common market for coal and steel - mainly as a device to
ensure supra-national control over German coal and steel without
having to deny indefinitely to Germany the degree of national
autonomy enjoyed by other states. The European Coal and Steel
Community (ECSC) was established in August 1952 by France, Ger-
many, Italy and the Benelux countries; Britain decided to abstain
because of her opposition to the supra-national features of the
ECSC (Haas 1958).
In the following years, i.e. in the aftermath of the war in Kor-
ea, politicians of the six ECSC countries worked out (i) statutes
for a European defence community (EDO and a European political
community (EPO, both of which implied a far-reaching transfer of
powers to common institutions, and.<ii) a plan for a customs un-
ion. After the rejection of the EDC and - implicitly - the EPC by- 12 -
the French National Assembly in August 1954, prominent supporters
of political unification changed their strategy and opted for an
indirect approach: a common market was to become the nucleus of
political integration (Kusters 1982, Dankert 1982). On March 25,
1957, representatives of the six ECSC states signed the Rome
Treaties to establish a European Economic Community (and a Euro-
pean Atomic Energy Community, Euratom). According to these trea-
ties, which went into force on January 1, 1958, the member states
were to
<i) abolish all restrictions on intra-union trade in industrial
goods and services,
(ii) lift all restrictions on the free movement of capital and
labour within the union,
(iii) organize a common market for agricultural products, the de-
tails of which were to be decided by 1962,
<iv) introduce a common external tariff , and to
(v) secure some harmonization of economic and social policy.
These objectives were to be attained within a transition period
of twelve years - which could be prolonged for three years in
case of difficulties (Kusters 1982).
Initially, Britain had participated in the expert committee. How-
ever, she left the negotiations at an early stage because the
British government (i) resented even mild versions of supra-
nationalism, and (ii) did not take the talks very seriously. In
early 1957, the British government presented the idea of an OEEC-
wide free-trade area for non-agricultural goods as a substitute
for, or at least a complement to, the EEC (Kusters 1982). This
was finally rejected by the EEC in late 1958. Consequently, Bri-
tain, three countries with close links with Britain (Denmark,
For most products the new duties were to be calculated as the
arithmetic average of the 1.1.1957 tariff rates of the four
customs areas within the EEC: high tariff. France, high tariff
Italy, low tariff Germany and low tariff Benelux. For some
products, the duties were to be fixed closer to the original
French rates (Auerbach 1965, Kusters 1982).Bib/iofhek
Norway and Portugal) and three countries committed to political
neutrality and thus unwilling to join the EEC (namely Switzer-
land, Austria and Sweden) formed the European Free Trade Associa-
7)
tion (EFTA) for non-agricultural products on May 3, 1960 . Thus,
Western Europe was divided into two trading blocs.
Ill.b. The Predominance of Politics
Theories of political economy suggest analysing the attitudes of
organised interest.groups in order to explain the actual course
of trade policy. However, it has to be emphasized that neither
German trade unions nor German industry had favoured the "little
Europe" which finally materialised.
8) Sure enough, the German Federation of Trade Unions (DGB) and
9) the Federation of German Industry (BDI) differed with regard to
concepts of economic integration. While the unions favoured an
integration from above, i.e., the establishment of strong supra-
national institutions, industrialists emphasized the need for an
integration from below, i.e., the integration of markets without
a fusion of state institutions. However, subject to the introduc-
tion of some escape clauses for branches which felt particularly
threatened, both trade unions and industry supported a free-trade
area encompassing at least the entire OEEC area. Unlike the BDI,
German unions even welcomed unilateral tariff cuts. The rapid
growth in GNP and the equally impressive reduction in
7)
For an excellent survey of what the EEC and the EFTA had in
common and where they differed see Kramer (1968).
8)
From 195E onwards, the "Gewerkschaf 11 iche Monatshef t.e" , the
theoretical journal of the trade unions (DGB), published
quarterly surveys on "The State of European Integration" ("Der
Stand der europaischen Integration"). For further statements and
analyses of union attitudes see Haas (1958), Friedrichs (1957),
Haferkamp (1964), Riess (1955). •
9)See Haas (1958), Braunthal (1965, p. 3.17 ff), Zigan (1964),
Berg (1966).- 14 -
unemployment during the 1950s had made them Milling to adopt a
long-term rather than a short-term orientation, implying a readi-
ness to accept broad rather than narrow liberalisation packages.
Prominent trade unionists perceived liberalisation as an oppor-
tunity to raise productivity and thus real wages (Kiihne 1957).
Therefore, they would probably have backed the removal of some
barriers to trade vis-a-vis non-industrialized or industrializing
countries as well. With regard to sunk costs, i.e., the debase-
ment of the value of some human and physical capital which is
caused by structural change, at least some union leaders were
ready to opt for state subsidized retraining rather than the ar-
tificial preservation of unprofitable lines of production. Inci-
dentally, retraining is no option for owners of activity-specific
physical capital and resources (say, coal mines) and a less at-
tractive one for farmers, who - in the course of structural
change to their detriment of agriculture - would lose via falling
land prices even if they could easily find a new job.
All in all, arguments of political economy alone cannot explain
why Germany consented to the "little European" solution instead
of vigorously promoting a more encompassing package. Politics
played the decisive role.
A closer look at the attitude of Fritz Berg, president of the BDI
from 1951-71, is quite revealing in this context. Berg was will-
ing to accept a European Economic Community even in the absence
of a free-trade agreement with the rest of the OEEC mainly be-
cause of two considerations:
(1) The smaller the number of countries, the easier the cross-
border cooperation of firms would be. According to Berg, not
supra-national dirigism, but a healthy and continuous under-
standing among industrialists across national frontiers was
going to integrate the European economy (Haas 1958, p.
173 f.; Berg 1966). Here, the trade unions, who were afraid
that cartels might stifle the increase in competition that
would otherwise result from liberalisation (Baternus 1959),
clearly had a case in point.- 15 -
(E) Berg was genuinely committed to the idea of close political
collaboration between France and Germany, even if this im-
plied some economic sacrifices. A free trade agreement be-
tween the ECSC six and the rest of the OEEC, although eco-
nomically desirable, should not be pursued if it jeopardized
the political substance of the EEC (Berg 1966, p. 397) and
the Franco-German reconciliation.
The second point describes exactly the position which the German
representatives adopted in the negotiations on the founding of
the EEC and the subsequent unsuccessful talks on an OEEC-wide
free-trade agreement. Not Erhard, but Adenauer and Hallstein de-
termined the principal elements of the German bargaining position
(Kusters 1982). They perceived economic integration as a means to
the end of closer political cooperation or even integration in
Europe. Adenauer was willing to disregard economics in order to
further his political aims, the binding of West Germany to Wes- . .
tern Europe in general and Franco-German friendship in particu-
lar. Therefore, the Germans accepted a variety of French demands,
the most important of which was the termination of talks on a
free-trade agreement between the EEC and the other OEEC members
in November 1958.
Because of Germany's readiness to yield to French demands, French
rather than German politics have to be put into focus in order to
explain the course of events. The decisive years of 1957 and 1958
were a time of political and economic crisis in France. Besides
great farmers, all organized economic interest groups were scep-
tical of trade liberalisation. Both industrialists (DIHT 1956)
and trade unions (Haas 1958) emphasized that French industry
would be at a competitive disadvantage due to higher labour costs
in general and her generous social security benefits in particu-
lar. Therefore, labour costs and social security systems should
be harmonized before intra-European tariffs could be abolished.
Furthermore, a preferential trade area should not be extended
beyond the ECSC six (including colonies) in order to delimit the
perceived threat to French industry. As if to prove this point, a
balance of payments crisis compelled France in June 1957 to- 16 -
reintroduce the import quotas for most industrial goods which she
had lifted in the previous years.
To evaluate the attitudes of French industry and trade unions,
two issues have to be clearly distinguished: (i) the issue of the
overall cost level and <ii) the issue of structural change. If -
at the going exchange rate - the overall level of production
costs in one country is above that of its neighbours, a move to-
wards freer trade will induce a surge of imports in this country
which is not matched by a corresponding export growth - at least
not until internal factor prices have fallen sufficiently. The
balance of payments will exhibit a substantial deficit. French
anxieties focused on such a cost level differential - i.e., a
problem that could have been solved by a devaluation - and not on
the genuine consequence of liberalisation, i.e., pressure for
structural adjustment that would result from an increased intra-
European division of labour.
Consequently, the attitudes of French industry changed after de
Gaulle had implemented a liberal reform in 1958. This "Plan
Rueff" combined fiscal austerity with a devaluation of the franc
by 17.55 '/• and a removal of most import quotas on intra-European
trade. It paved the way for the introduction of currency conver-
tibility by almost all OEEC members on December 27, 1958. From
now on, opposition to the EEC weakened. Soon there were even
hints that important parts of French industry were no longer op-
posed to a free-trade agreement encompassing Western Europe as a
whole (Donner 1959).
The last governments of the Fourth Republic had been too weak to
reform the French economy profoundly enough to make France ready
for freer trade in a broader framework, a step which these gov-
ernments would presumably not have opposed for political reasons.
Unfortunately, the very politician who finally removed the obsta-
cles to an ambitious liberalisation of trade preferred a "little
Europe" without the United Kingdom for political reasons - and
thus caused the economic division of Western Europe.- 17 -
III.e. Integration Efforts during the 1960s
The development of the EEC during the 1960s closely resembles the
pattern of the integration efforts from 195** to 1959.
(1) Like the European Defence Community and the European Politi-
cal Community in 195*+, all ambitious plans for a political
union failed. France was not ready to strengthen the supra-
national character of the EEC; the German Bundestag (unlike
Adenauer) was not willing to endorse the anti-Anglo-American
features of de Gaulle's scheme for a close Franco-German
collaboration; and the smaller EEC states were afraid that a
Franco-German coalition might neglect their interests. Once
again, the political emphasis was put on economic integra-
tion - not merely as an end in itself, but rather as a nec-
essary detour on the way to eventual political unification.
(E) The attitudes of industrialists and trade unions remained
more or less the same but for two changes: Industrialists
were more willing to endorse a common stabilization policy
than before (Zigan 196*+), while some trade union leaders
detected a need "to balance the interests" of consumers,
i.e., free trade, with those of workers in declining indus-
tries, i.e., protection <Haferkamp 196*+).
(3) Still, the liberalisation of intra-EEC trade in industrial
goods posed no major problem. Rapid growth (Table 1) made it
possible to accelerate the planned tariff reductions and
complete the customs union on July 1, 1968, 18 months ahead
of schedule
.(*•) As during the negotiations of the fifties, agriculture turn-
ed out to be the main problem of "1ittle European" integra-
tion. France insisted on taking the first steps towards a
The remaining duties on intra-EFTA trade were abolished even
six months earlier (Kramer 1968).- 18 -
common market for agriculture by 1962, if possible coupled
with a system of subsidies to be financed mainly by the
richer member countries, while farmers and government in
Germany wanted to preserve their comparatively intervention-
ist national market orders ("Marktordnungen") for as long as
possible. The compromise reached in early 1962 provided for
the gradual introduction of a common market with politically
determined prices, rigid market orders and variable import
levies and export duties for most products (von der Groeben
1982).
The dynamics of trade diversion had a strong impact on European
and American politicians in the sixties. Both the U.S. and some
non-EEC states of Europe launched initiatives to mitigate the ef-
fects of the EEC on their exports. Throughout the fifties the
U.S. government had strongly encouraged various attempts at Euro-
pean economic integration. However, as the U.S. post-war trade
surplus gradually turned into a deficit in the late fifties and
early sixties, U.S. business started to perceive a European eco-
nomic community as a substantial threat to its exports (von der
Groeben 19S2). Consequently, the U.S. convened two GATT rounds of
multilateral tariff reductions. In the Dillon-Round (1961-62)
the EEC agreed to lower the basis for the calculation of the com-
mon external tariff by 20 '/. for most industrial goods while other
participants were to reduce their tariffs by 7 '/. on average. The
Kennedy-Round (May 196^-June 1967) was more successful, although
the, result fell short of the initially envisaged 50 */. target:
tariffs for industrial goods were to be reduced by 35 '/. to *+0 */.
The beginning of the Dillon-Round was dominated by an argument
between the EEC and the other participants who claimed that the
EEC's common external tariff would be higher than the average of
the national pre-integration tariffs. Thus, the EEC should cut
its tariffs unilaterally to comply with the GATT rule that the
establishment of customs unions should not lead to an increase in
external protection. The EEC had made its offer to reduce the
future common tariffs by 20 '/. contingent on equivalent
"concessions" by other participants (Donner 1961).- 19 -
12)
on a mutual basis until January 1, 1972 . Due to the Kennedy-
Round, the average 1972 tariffs on Germany's extra-EEC imports of
manufactures were once again below their 1958 level (7.3 versus
9.0 */.), down from 11 */. in 1964 (Donges et al . 1973).
Already in mid-1961, the U.K., Denmark and Ireland had applied
for entry into the EEC, followed by Norway in April 1962 (EEC,
Sprecher der Kommission, 1967). Agriculture and the future trade
relations between the U.K. and the Commonwealth were the most im-
portant issues in the negotiations (von der Groeben, 1982). How-
ever, when the talks with all four applicants were adjourned in
January 1963, the reason was not an economic but a political one:
de Gaulle perceived the entry of the U.K. as a threat to his idea
of close Franco-German collaboration. In spite of this set-back,
the same four countries renewed their applications four years
later. Once again, de Gaulle forced the EEC to interrupt the
negotiations without fixing a new date. Finally, in the early
1970s, de Gaulle's successor, Pompidou, agreed to the first en-
largement of the EEC as of January 1, 1973.
From 1973 to mid-1977 tariffs between the original EEC six and
13) the EFTA seven were gradually abolished as all original EFTA
members had either joined the Community (U.K. and Denmark) or
concluded parallel free trade agreements with the EEC (Austria,
Sweden, Switzerland, Portugal and - with a delay - Norway). Thus,
the economic division of Western Europe ended. Incidentally, a
few months after the two Western European trading blocs had
12)
The EEC implemented these cuts in four steps: 40 */. of the
reduction was enacted on July 1, 1968, the day of the
introduction of the common external tariff, and 20 '/. each at the
beginning of 1970, 1971 and 1972.
13)
Unless stated otherwise, the term EEC always refers to the
original EEC six and the term EFTA always to the original EFTA





































































































































































































































(a).Average annual rates of change; GNP, exports and imports in constant prices
(b) 1953 - 1960.
(c) 1952 - 1960.
Source: Dicke et al. 1987, p. 15.- 21 -
14) started to fuse , the U.S. proposed a new round of multilateral
trade negotiations in the GATT framework (Tokyo-Round 1973-79).
IV. The Impact of "Little Europe" on West Germany's Foreign
Trade
The effects of the EEC (and the EFTA) on trade in manufactures
have been investigated in numerous empirical studies (see Balas-
sa, 1974, for a survey). The main task of all these studies has
been to deduce hypothetical non-integration trade flows which can
then be compared to the actual ones. Some authors (i.a. Balassa
1967, EFTA 1972) use pre-integration times series (i) to estab-
lish a non-integration trend of real imports (or import shares in
income or apparent consumption) or (ii) to estimate the parame-
ters of import demand functions. However, the development of
trade flows in the pre-integration years, i.e. the second half of
the 1950s, was affected by a variety of special features like the
removal of quantitative restrictions under the auspices of the
OEEC, the French balance of payments crises of 1957 and 1958 and
her subsequent reliberalisation, and - in the case of Germany -
by the inclusion of the Saar region from July 1959 onwards, a
region which had previously been part of the high tariff French
customs area.
Therefore, other authors (i.a. Kreinin 1972) have normalized the
development of European post-integration imports (or income elas-
ticities of imports or import shares in apparent consumption re-
spectively) by the changes in the corresponding variables in
third countries over the same period, taking for instance the
U.S. or the entire rest of the world as the control group. How-
ever, doubts remain whether either the rest of the world -
14)
This perspective, namely to view the first EEC enlargement and
the parallel free trade agreements with the remaining EFTA
countries as the fusion of two trading blocs, has been suggested
by Kreinin (1981).- 22 -
consisting mainly of countries at a different stage of economic
development - or the United States alone — which in the relevant
post-integration period of the late sixties and early seventies
suffered from the economic repercussions of the Viet Nam war -
can serve as a normalizer for European countries.
This paper tries to illustrate the effect of the EEC on West
Ger many's foreign trade in a different way. It contrasts the
relative importance of two roughly comparable groups of countries
as trading partners for Germany: the original EEC and the
original EFTA countries. Data for the non-discrimination years of
1960 (for some purposes data for low-discrimination 1962 has
to be used for statistical reasons) and 1980 (or 1984 respective-
ly) is compared to data for 197S, the last year of full discrimi-
nation between suppliers of manufactures from EEC and EFTA
countries on the German market.
Sure enough, this approach cannot yield any estimate of static
trade diversion proper, i.e., the replacement of more efficient
EFTA suppliers by less efficient EEC producers in the German mar-
ket : A fter the fusion of the two European trading blocks, EFTA
producers themselves benefitted from the redirection of trade to
Intra-EEC tariffs had been cut by 10 '/. on January 1, 1959, and
by the same amount on July 1, 1960, vis-a-vis the January 1957
level. However, this implied no major change in German import
duties because West Germany had already reduced her tariffs
unilaterally in mid-1957 for cyclical reasons. Discrimination
between EEC and EFTA suppliers began in earnest on January 1,
1961, with a further cut in intra-tariffs by 10 percentage points
and the first step of the adjustment to the future common
external tariff (30 '/. of the entire adjustment). Intra-tariffs
for manufactures were cut again on 1.1.1962 (to 60 '/• of the
national 1957 rates), on 1.7.1962 (to 50 */.) , 1.7.1963 (to 40 V.) ,
1.1.1965 (to 30 '/.), 1.1.1966 (to 20 */.) , 1.7.1967 (to 15 */.) and
were finally abolished by- July 1, 1968 (Kramer 1968). Once again,
Germany had moved faster than the other countries by reducing her
intra-tar if fs to 20 V. on July 1, 1964, already in order to
mitigate inflationary pressures during a cyclical boom (EEC,
Sprecher der Kommission, 1967). Further adjustments of Germany's
external tariffs to the higher common rates took place on
1.1.1963 (by 30 */. of. the original gap) and on 1.7.1968 (by 40 */.
of the original gap minus the Kennedy-Round tariff cuts).- 23 -
the detriment of non-Europeans. However, this approach may illus-
trate the export opportunities which European countries did fore-
go by not forming an OEEC-wide free trade area in the late fif-
ties in the first place. Thus, this approach is well-suited to
shed light on the incentive to non-EEC countries to tear down the
trade barriers between them and the EEC, i.e., to highlight the
economic mainsprings of the liberalisation process which was ini-
tiated by the establishment of the "little European" customs un-
ion .
Unsurprisingly, the economic division of Western Europe had a
profound impact on trade flows. Tables 2a) and 2b) demonstrate
that the importance of intra-EEC and intra-EFTA trade in manufac-
tures relative to trade across the divide increased in the period
from 1960-72 and decreased in the following period from 1972-80
for all EEC and EFTA countries. Invariably, exports to and im-
ports from the own trading block grew at a much higher rate than
trade across the divide in the first period, while the opposite
happened in the second period, i.e., during and after the fusion
of the EEC and EFTA to one free trade area. The only exception
to this rule is the United Kingdom, whose exports to the EEC al-
ready grew slightly faster than those to the EFTA members in the
1960-72 period. Obviously, this demonstrates a genuine trend away
from imperial long-distance trade towards an increased division
of labour with her immediate neighbours across the Channel. In
1960, the U.K. had sent a much smaller share of her manufactured
exports to Europe and especially to her immediate neighbours than
any other country in the sample.
In a different way, West Germany is a special case as well. As
the EEC member with the lowest share of imports from the Commun-
ity and the highest share of imports from EFTA countries, the
Data on Norway's 1980 exports ar& indicative only because the
destination of some 25 V, of her manufactured exports could not be
specified (OECD, Foreign Trade, Series B, No. 4, Jan.-Dec. 1980,
p. 68).- 24 -
Table 2: Trade in Manufactures
3 between EEC and EFTA Members 1960,1972,1980
Table 2as Imports
Share of Imports from
EEC EFTA
1960 1972 1980 1960 1972 1980















































































































































































Share of Exports to
EEC EFTA
1960 1972 1980 1960 1972 - 1980
30.3 46.5 42.9 21.4 17.5 19.'7






































































































































































Share in total imports (exports); manufactures only.
"Imports from (exports to) EFTA countries divided by the respective imports from (exports to)
EEC countries; manufactures only.
Average annual growth rate of imports from (exports to) EEC countries minus the respective growth
rate of trade with EFTA countries; manufactures only.
Source: OECD (OEEC) Foreign Trade, Series B, 1960, 1972, 1980.- 25 -
abolition of tariffs on intra-trade and the - albeit temporary -
rise in duties on extra EEC imports led to ah above average dis-
tortion of the regional composition of her imports. The same does
not hold for exports, especially not in the 1972-80 period in
which Germany's EFTA exports grew only slightly faster (by 0.8
percentage points) than her exports to the original EEC members.
One reason for this feature might be that a comparatively high
share of German EFTA exports went to countries which had imposed
only low import duties before 1972 in the first place (most not-
ably Switzerland).
A closer look at German exports and imports reveals that the EEC-
EFTA rift distorted not only the level but also the commodity
structure of trade. Employing Balassa's 1966 formula to distin-
guish between inter- and intra-industry trade, the following re-
sults emerge: While in 1960 the intra-industry share in Germany's
trade with the EEC and the EFTA had been about even, this share
rose rapidly vis-a-vis the EEC and remained almost unchanged with
regard to the EFTA (Table 3). Afterwards, the gap narrowed con-
Table 3: Relative Importance of Intra-industry Specialisation
in West Germany's Foreign Trade
Share of intra-trade in Manufactures All Commodities
0





































r^n I x -M|
aComputed by the use of. the formula (1 - - J. — * ) • 100
i = l "*" "*"
X^, M^: exports, imports of commodity, i.
SITC-sections 5-8; two-digit level; n=28.
SITC-sections 0-9; two-digit level except for SITC 0,4,9
(one-digit level); n=46. .••..-.•
Source: Own calculations based on data from OECD (OEEC) Foreign Trade,
Series B, .various issues.- 26 -




Inport Share in ACM
by Source of Inports
Ratio of Inports from EFTA




























































































































































































































aExcluding food processing and petrol products.
In billion EM at 1972 prices (deflator: producer price index).
CIncluding the Saar region which changed from the French to the German customs area in
July 1959.
""Excluding the Saar region until June 1959.
Source: Own calculations; data taken from Statistisches Bundesamt (SB), Statistische
Jahrbucher, various issues; SB, Fachserie 7, Reihe 7, various issues, SB, Fach-
serie 7, Reihe 4.1.1., various issues; SB, Fachserie 18, Reihe S.7, 1950-84;
OECD Foreign Trade, Series B, 1960-62; SVR 1987; S. 357.- 27 -
siderably. Clearly, the "little European" customs unions had ac-
celerated the trend towards intra-industry specialisation between
Germany and her partner countries in the EEC and delayed this
trend vis-a-vis the EFTA. The corresponding figures for trade
with the U.S. indicate a growing importance of the intra-industry
type of specialisation in both periods, a development, though,
which started at a much lower base.
Chart Is Discrimination and Re-Integration








1 1 1 1 1)11
1960 1965 19701972(b) 1975 1980 1985 1987
Manufactures only, excluding food processing and petrol
products; EFTA 7, EEC 6.
Last year of full tariff discrimination between EEC and
EFTA suppliers.
Source: See table 4.
A direct comparison of Germany's manufactured imports from EEC
and EFTA countries yields the clearest evidence of the impact of
the economic division and subsequent reuniting of Western Europe
(Table 4, Chart 1)'. in 1960, German manufactured imports from the
EFTA countries amounted ,to 72.1 '/.of those from the EEC. This
ratio fell continuously until it had more than halved by 1972
(31.8 */.). From 1973 onwards, i.e., concurrent with the first- 28 -
steps towards a fusion of both trading blocs, the share rose
again to 55.7 */. in 1984
17
) and 59.7 '/. in 1987 (Chart 1). If the
imports of all commodities are taken into account, the swing is
even slightly more impressive: from 66 */. in 1960 to 28.2 V. in
1972 and back to 57.3 •/. in 1984 (57.0 '/. in 1987) (Table 4).
Obviously, the distortion in the regional composition of West
Germany's imports can be attributed to the tariff wedge between
EEC and EFTA suppliers. Table 5 presents further evidence to cor-
roborate this hypothesis. Firstly, the differences in the growth
rates of imports from EEC and from EFTA countries are calculated
for the periods 1962-72 and 1972-84, disaggregated according to
the German industrial classification of manufactured products.
All but one of the growth rate differentials show the expected
sign: imports from the EEC grew faster than those from the EFTA
countries in the first period and slower in the second. The odd
industry out is the aircraft industry. Here, producers from the
original EEC gained market shares relative to their EFTA competi-
tors even in the second period - presumably a consequence of the
subsidies to Airbus Industrie which is still mostly an affair of
the original EEC six. As a second step, the swing in growth rate
differentials between the two periods is calculated. A comparison
of these figures with the 1972 effective rates of tariff protec-
tion for the products concerned reveals the following: the swing
in growth rate differentials,was most pronounced for products
subject to comparatively high rates of effective protection
(clothing, plastic products, petrol products, paper products) and
least pronounced for products with low rates of effective protec-
tion (stone goods, mechanical engineering, printing). The Spear-
man rank correlation between the difference in pre- and post-1972
growth rate differentials and the corresponding 1972 effective
tariff rates yields a highly significant coefficient of 0.54 (Ta-
ble 5). Clearly, the height of the respective tariff barrier is
17)
As 1972 is the twelfth year after the economic division of
Western Europe had begun in earnest in 1961, 1984 is the twelfth
year after the start of the fusion of the two trading blocs in
1973.- 29 -
Table 5s Tariffs and Trade Distortion
Growth Rates of German Imports of Manufactures from EEC



































































































































































All Manufactures b,d 8.30 -4.80 13.10 9.1
Spearman rank correlation coefficient between swing in differentials and 1972 effective
tariff rates: 0.5432, significant at the 0.1 % level; for 1972 nominal tariff rates:
0.487, significant at the 0.2 % level.
aGrowth rate of German imports from EEC countries minus respective rate for imports from
EFTA countries; in %.
Including nuclear industry products, which are not listed separately for lack of data
on 1962 imports.
cIncluding NfM-products.
Including steel shaping and data processing equipment which are not listed separately
for lack of data on the effective tariff rates and on 1962 imports respectively.
Tariff code excepts all inputs from duties.
Source: Own calculations; tariff data taken from Klepper et al. 1987; for trade data:
see table 4.- 30 -
Table 6: Trade Distortion
Actual vs. Hypothetical Share of EFTA Imports in







































































































































































































Assuming a constant growth rate of the share of EFTA imports in German apparent consumption
between the base years 1962 and 1984.
Divergence multiplied by German apparent consumption; in million DM at 1972 prices.
Excluding nuclear industry (no 1962 data available).
Excluding data processing equipment (no 1962 data available).
Source: Own calculations; data: see table 4.- 31 -
one important factor to. explain the development of market shares.
However, there is no reason to expect a perfect correlation be-
tween tariffs and import growth rates as the price elasticities
of supply and demand may differ considerably between products.
Table 6 presents a rough estimate of the opportunities for ex-
porting to Germany which the EFTA countries had to forego because
of the EEC-EFTA rift. The actual 1972 share of EFTA imports in
German apparent consumption of manufactures (ACM) is contrasted
with a hypothetical one, the calculation of which assumes that,
in the absence of discrimination, the share of EFTA imports in
German ACM would have grown at a constant rate between the base
years 1962 and 1984. For most products the actual share is con-
siderably below the hypothetical one. This time, the odd industry
out is shipbuilding - which is not altogether surprising as the
1972 effective rate of protection of this industry had been
-9.3 */. (Table 5). All in all, the export opportunities foregone
by the EFTA countries amount to 1 •/. of German ACM for the year
1972, equivalent to 5.052 billion DM in 1972 prices (excluding
petrol products: 4.803 billion DM).
Unfortunately, these figures can be no more than a first rough
indicator of magnitude: due to the lack of sufficiently disaggre-
gated data for the initial period, low discrimination 1962 in-
stead of non-discrimination 1960 had to be taken as the first
base year for the product-by-product estimates shown in Table 6.
Therefore, a somewhat more sophisticated estimate of the aggre-
18) gate losses employs 1960 and 1987 as base years (see Table 7).
Furthermore, an attempt is made to eliminate any distortion of
the results that might arise from cyclical or exchange rate ef-
fects. We proceed as follows: as a first step, the determinants
of the actual ratio of all imports to German ACM,in the period
1960-1987 are estimated by four alternative regression analyses,
assuming that the development of these shares can be explained by
10)
Taking 1987 instead of 1984 as the second base year hardly
alters the results at all.- 32 -
a constant trend rate of growth of these shares over time (equa-
tion 1, Table 7), a constantly declining rate of growth (equation
2) plus changes in the degree of capacity utilisation in Germany
(equation 3) plus movements of Germany's real effective exchange
rate in the current and the previous year (equation 4). All para-
meters display the expected sign, equation h fits the data best.







































































Y: Share of imports in apparent consumption of manufactures; Ti time, 1960=1; K: change in capacity
utilisation over previous period, in percentage points; E: real effective exchange rate, 1960=100;
SE: standard error; R
2: adjusted R
J; DW: Durbin-Watson statistics; n = 28.
aShown are the respective parameters, ( ): t-statistics; in million DM at 1972 prices; Significant at
the 1% level; Significant at the 2.5% level.
Data sources: see table 4.- 33 -
In a second step, we employ these parameters to compute what the
1960 and 1987 import shares would have been if the degree of ca-
pacity utilisation and the real effective exchange rate had not
differed from their 1972 levels. Thirdly, we assume that Ger-
many's EFTA imports react to changes in the degree of capacity
utilisation and exchange rates in the same way as her overall im-
ports. Therefore, the actual 1960, and 1987 shares of EFTA imports
in ACM are adjusted by the same proportion by which the actual
19) overall import shares differ from the normalised ones
calculated in step two. In a further step, these adjusted figures
for 1960 and 1987 serve as the basis for the calculation of a
hypothetical 1972 share of EFTA imports in ACM, assuming a
constant (equation 1) or a constantly declining trend rate of
20) growth of these shares (equation 2-4). The difference between
the hypothetical and the actual 1972 figure yields the estimates
of trade foregone displayed in the last column of Table 7. The
most, plausible figure, i.e., the one derived from equation 4, is
7.0 billion DM. In other words, without the economic division of
Western Europe, Germany's 1972 imports from the EFTA countries
would have exceeded their actual level by 7 billion DM or k9 'A.
This number is still likely to underestimate the real losses in-
curred by EFTA exporters (and German consumers). Without the EEC-
EFTA rift, growth in Western Europe might have been faster, im-
plying a higher level of ACM i.a. in Germany and thus more German
imports from all countries including the EFTA seven.
19)
The figures derived from equation 4 are adjusted for the
lagged effect of the exchange rate on imports and for the
divergence in the development of Germany's overall effective
exchange and the external value of the DM vis-a-vis the EFTA
seven as well. Furthermore, all figures are adjusted for the
respective error terms.
20)We assume that the ratio between the two trend parameters (J
and (ip calculated for the growth of the overall import share
holds for the EFTA share as well.- 34 -
V. Conclusions
Regional liberalisation clubs can serve as catalysts for a much
broader removal of barriers to trade. Trade diversion to their
detriment and the example of successful trade creation within a
club provides economic agents in non-member countries with an in-
centive to accept a liberalisation package which they might
otherwise have rejected. These dynamics of trade diversion were
clearly at work from the late 1950s onwards. The establishment of
a "little European" club called EEC in 1958 initiated a process
which culminated in the abolition of almost all remaining tariffs
on manufactures between most Western European states twenty years
later. However, the economic division of Western Europe from 1958
to 1977 was not"a necessary and thus economically justifiable
stage on the way towards freer trade in Europe. The conditions
under/which a small rather a more encompassing club is the most
feasible first step towards liberalisation were not given at that
time. German industry and trade unions had favoured a more multi-
lateral approach while French anxieties could have been - and
eventually were - resolved by a devaluation. Instead of making a
more ambitious liberalisation package feasible, politics got in
the way. The result was a severe distortion of trade flows within
Europe. Germany paid a high price for a Gaul list Europe which -
incidentally - did not even materialize.- 35 -
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